Operation MatterhornB-29's in the China-Burma-India Theater of World War II
In August, 1943, the Air Staff of Headquarters, Army Air Forces, prepared a plan to use a new weapon,the B-29 Superfortress, from Chinese territory to attack Japan pending capture of islands bases nearer to Japan. Gen. "Hap"Arnold, Commanding General, AAF, wanted the first B-29's operational in China by April 15, 1944. The last of the initial batch of 150 B-29's were combat ready and on their way to China by that time to begin the bomber offensive.(A total of 3,898 B-29's were produced during World War II at an average cost of $639,188 each in 1944 dollars). The B-29 went from a design concept to an operational weapon in five years.Less than three years separated their first flight and the Hiroshima mission.
Initial planning for the China-based B-29's envisioned a force of 780 B-29's supported by the ATCfrom India, across the "Hump," attacking Japanese targets in Manchuria and Japan. This plan was later revised byGenerals Stilwell and Stratemeyer to forward base the B-29's from permanent and secure bases in India. Under thisplan, called "Operation Matterhorn," they anticipated that largely self-sufficient B-29's would carry their own fueland bombs from India into China. Unfortunately, this did not work out.
Then there was the problem of who would command the B-29's. In China, Gen. Chennault wanted tohave operational control; likewise did Lord Louis Mountbatten, commander of SEAC; as did Gen. MacArthur for thosebase in the southwest Pacific.
The final solution was a compromise by placing them under the direct command of Gen. "Hap" Arnoldas the executive agent for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The new bomber force was designated the 20th Air Force, and established on April 4, 1944, with two subordinate commands: the XX Bomber Command under Brig. Gen. Wolfe, and the XXI Bomber Command under Brig. Gen.Hansell. to be based in the Marianas after their seizure from the enemy. Theater commanders were directed to supportthem.
Ironically, the major use of the B-29's against Japan would not be from bases in China but ratherfrom bases in the central Pacific.
Operation Matterhorn
The B-29's first flew in combat on June 5, 1944. Ninety-eight planes from bases in India raided theMakasan rail center in Bangkok. It was not a good start, damage was light, five were forced to ditch, 14 others abortedearly and one crashed at take-off. Less than 20 bombs fell on the target area.
On the next raid, June 14, 1944, 68 planes (out of 92 that left India) took off from Chinaand raided iron works at Yawata, Japan. Seven B-29's were lost due to mechanical problems and accidents. This raidindicated the difficulty of operating from India to China, thence to Japanese targets, particularly as the B-29's were still immature systems. Gen. Arnold wanted 70 planes over the target, but only 47 actually made it to Yawataand only one plane hit the target with one 500-pound bomb.
The B-29's could not carry all the bombs and fuel needed to support operations in China. Instead,they had to call on the Air Transport Command (ATC) to carry no less than 25%, and up to 100% of the monthly tonnagerequired by the B-29's. So, supplying them took considerable resources away from the 14th Air Force, which did notplease Gen. Chennault. Subsequent analysis indicated that the XX Bomber Command was only free to use 14% of itsB-29's against the Japanese. The others were used as ferry tankers keeping the B-29's supplied with fuel. As Gen.LeMay recalled after the war:
"When ordered to fly a mission out of China, we had to make seven trips with a B-29 and off-load all the gas we could, leaving only enough to get back to India. On the eighth trip we would transport a load of bombs,top off with gas in China, and go drop them on Japan if the weather was right. Then we'd start the process all overagain. So the logistical situation was hopeless in China."
Right after the Yawata raid, Gen. Arnold ordered another long strike against steel mills in Manchuria. Gen. Wolfe, commander of the XX Bomber Command, protested, so Gen. Arnold replaced him with Gen. CurtisLeMay from Europe. When the latter took over, he found a pretty desperate situation. As a result, the XX Bomber Commanddidn't fly another mission until early July when it returned to Japan for a series of small strikes, followed by a strike on a Manchurian steel mill on July 29.
Thereafter, through the end of 1944, XX Bomber Command flew an additional 33 major missions againsttargets in Japan, Manchuria, China and Southeast Asia.
Several of these strikes were quite successful, especially the destruction of the dock area atHankow by incendiaries. The success of the latter raid greatly influenced LeMay's subsequent raids on Japan. He recognizedthat targets in Japan were vulnerable to incendiary attack. So, the CBI operations by XX Bomber Command in 1944 wasa learning experience.
The XX Bomber Command staggered on throughout 1944 leaving its bases in China by the end of January,1945 in favor of basing in India before finally moving to the Marianas and being absorbed into the Eighth Air Forcein Okinawa in July of 1945. All in all, in had been a disappointment. LeMay wrote:
"Despite some modest successes and the lessons learned from the Hankow raid, we really didn'taccomplish as much in China as we had hoped. That would come later when we moved the B-29 bases to the Marianas.In the meantime, I recommended that Arnold not send any more B-29's to India after November 1944, because we reallycouldn't supply them adequately at the bases in China. The Marianas would be the beginning of the end of the roadto Tokyo."
So, later the XX Bomber Command became primarily a theater air arm for operations in CBI, firstfrom bases in China and then from bases in India. Of the 15 missions after November,1, 1944, only three hit Japan.Of the 37 missions in 1945, only four hit Japan, and there were no raids on Japan on the 26 missions flown fromJanuary 17, 1945 onward.
Like its namesake, "Matterhorn" was one tough mountain to climb.
Maj. Gen. LeMay left the XX Bomber Command and took over XXI Bomber Command in the Marianasreplacing Brig. Gen. Hansell on January 20, 1945. Gen. Arnold was not pleased with Hansell's early raids againstJapan (from high altitudes, to avoid fighter interceptors and in uncertain weather). His raid on January 19, 1945 was initially reported as 38% effective.
Hereafter, the new commander, Gen. LeMay, used the same program he employed in China emphasizinglow altitude incendiary attacks aimed at the heart of Japanese cities.
Whatever the failings of the early campaigns in China and the Marianas, they offered no comfort to the Japanese. The lessons learned earlier spawned furious attacks that later almost consumed many Japanese citiesand industrial areas, rivaling those of the atomic weapons.
The rest of the story is that Japanese leaders sacrificed the nation in a fight to the finish.That victory is a tribute to the B-29 crews and to those who supported them. The fact that they succeeded is thelegacy of the troublesome gestation through 1944 in the CBI Theater and the Marianas which took an immature airplaneand raw personnel to bring final victory over Japan.
Those who served in the China-Burma-India Theater can take pride in the fact that they nurturedand supported the force that eventually made the final victory possible.
Without the experience gained by B-29 crews in CBI, the results of the war in the Pacific might have beendifferent.