When U.S. Army transportation operations began in the CBI early in 1942, the ports available in India were limited.
The presence of the enemy within striking distance of the east coast precluded the use of ports in that area.
Bombay on the west coast was the main British port and was heavily congested with British traffic.
As a result, Karachi on the northwest coast became the first American port.
It had 22 ship berths and large ships could be moored in 60 feet of water.
Most cargo was unloaded from ship to railway cars with the aid of floating cranes.
Since there was no shipside or transit sheds, cargo was transported by rail, truck, or lighter.
Upon arrival of the first U.S. troops in March 1942, Gen. Wheeler, SOS commander, set up a provisional port detachment.
Their first job was to move 20,000 tons of China lend-lease cargo that was diverted from Singapore and Rangoon.
This detachment was replaced in May by two companies of the 393rd Port Battalion.
Port operations were under Headquarters Base Section No. 1 of the SOS.
During 1942, most U.S. supplies entered through Karachi. The port troops used native coolie labor.
During 1942, the port discharged and transshipped 130,342 tons of cargo; in addition to debarking 13,800 troops.
As soon as the tactical situation permitted, an east coast port closer to the forward areas was opened.
Starting in September 1942, supplies were transshipped from Karachi to Calcutta. The latter was opened to vessels
arriving from the U.S. in March 1943 and soon surpassed Karachi in importance.
With the shift from Karachi to Calcutta, the two port companies were transferred, one moving in February 1943, the
other in August 1943. Continuing port activities at Karachi were handled by a small Army staff supervising native labor,
but this did not impair operational efficiency. During 1943 Karachi, on three occasions, stood first among overseas
U.S. Army ports in monthly cargo discharge performance, and in December set a new port record for itself, unloading
5,645 tons from the S.S. Mark Hopkins in three days and 10 hours working time.
Karachi handled a dwindling traffic load in 1944; after January 1944 it became unimportant as a supply base.
The port's outstanding job during the year was the unloading of the Mark Twain with 5,597 tons of cargo within
48.5 hours after docking. Later, the need for an Army port in northwest India gradually disappeared.
On May 15, 1945, Base Section No. 1 was inactivated with the exception of a small detachment to unload
small shipments from tankers and some coast-wise cargo; then all troops were transferred throughout the CBI.
At war's end, Karachi Port was reactivated for debarkation of personnel (August 1945). Many troops were brought in by
rail from the Ledo and Chabua areas. As aircraft were withdrawn from the Hump run, they supplemented and later
supplanted the troop trains. The troops were billeted at the Replacement Depot at North Malir, 14 miles from the port,
and after processing were trucked to ship-side and embarked. The first troop transport to arrive, the General
McRae on September 22nd, took on 3,008 passengers. Evacuation operations peaked in October when 26,352 troops were
loaded on eight transports. The port was closed in January 1946 having embarked 80,185 personnel. Then, all port
troops were either transferred to Calcutta or returned to the U.S.
BOMBAY
Despite its magnificent deep-water harbor and excellent port facilities, Bombay was overtaxed by British and Indian
traffic, and remained so into 1943. As a result, it was not used to handle American cargo. However, since neither
Karachi nor Calcutta could accommodate large transports, Bombay became the major port of debarkation for American
troops entering CBI. During 1943, a total of 118,893 Americans passed through the port, including troops for the
Persian Gulf Service Command.
Initially, American operations were conducted by a small staff from Base Section No. 1, SOS.
They made arrangements with the British, who directed the debarkation of troops and the discharge of cargo;
providing berthing and staging facilities; and handled the onward rail movements. From Bombay, the troops traveled
1,300 miles by rail to Calcutta, and more than 2,100 miles to East Bengal or Assam.
On December 31, 1943, the Bombay Port of Debarkation was formally established with a small number of personnel which
gradually grew to 500. The mission was the debarkation of U.S. Army troops from transports which were usually berthed
at Ballard Pier. They also processed personnel leaving on American ships and also some coast-wise cargo.
Every action had to be cleared with British authorities which Americans found to be unsatisfactory.
This caused delays to unloading troops because of lack of rolling stock and poor timing of trains.
Gradually, though, one function after another was transferred, so that the U.S. port commander, eventually assumed
responsibility for most activities. Reliance on British staging facilities ended in July 1944 when an American
staging area was opened at Lake Beale, 125 miles from Bombay, at one of the main trans-India rollway connections.
That camp continued until October when a section of Camp Kalyan. a British staging area in Bombay, was made available
for personnel departing the Theater.
Camp Beale was then assigned to the SOS Replacement Service and was used exclusively as a staging area for troops
arriving in CBI.
Until late spring of 1944, most U.S. Army troops arrived on British transports after transshipment from War Service
Administration (WSA) vessels in the Mediterranean. Thereafter, they were brought in by U.S. Navy transports of the P-2
type. The first of these, the General Butner, arrived In May, followed in July by the General Randall.
This was a learning experience for the port commander. By the latter part of 1944. the Bombay port operation was proceeding
satisfactorily. The poor timing of the arrival of troop trains at quayside persisted, but this was steadily
improved. The goal was to insure a five-day turnaround for the ships, although the wait for convoy escorts occasionally
extended the time to seven days.
American operations were ended when the British wanted exclusive use of the port for anticipated post V-E Day
redeployment of their troops to India. After a successful trial run for two American transports to Calcutta in February
1945, it was decided to give up the Bombay port. The last transport to arrive at Bombay, the Admiral Benson late
in March, debarked 4,866 troops and took on 1,363 passengers. All debarkation activities were then shifted to Calcutta,
and on June 1st, Bombay was officially closed as an American port.
CALCUTTA
Calcutta is located in Bengal Province, 80 miles up the Hooghly River. The river followed a winding course and
was relatively shallow, accommodating ships with a draft of 22 to 30 feet, depending on the season. It had 49 berths,
most of which could accommodate ocean going vessels, and 44 ships could be anchored in the stream. The more modern of
these faculties, the King George and the Kiddepore Docks, were inside the tidal locks. Most wharves were equipped with
transit sheds, and there was a fair amount of shore and floating equipment.
Unloading medical supplies at Calcutta (1944)
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The port was served by three broad-gauge rail lines; the Bengal and Assam Railway having tracks into the docks.
The labor supply was ample. Proximity of the enemy precluded its use earlier, but by the end of 1942, six small
vessels under the supervision of a U.S. Army Engineer unit. had been discharged.
Port operations began to expand when upon the recommendation of the Anglo-American Shipping Mission, shipping was
routed directly from the U.S. to Calcutta. About 8,000 tons of U.S. Army and China-aid supplies arrived in March 1943,
and incoming tonnage mounted steadily thereafter. The two port companies from Karachi (540th and 541st) took
over operations. The King George Docks were used mainly, and also the Kiddepore Docks. The port troops supervised
coolie labor and in an effort to unload maximum tonnage, they operated in 12 hour shifts and worked as long as 18
hours at a stretch.
As the work load increased, and insufficient personnel were on hand, ships arriving from Colombo, Ceylon, had to be
bunched in convoys, and thus delayed from 3-10 days awaiting berths.
At the same time, the inability of the Assam Line of Communication (LOC) to carry the cargo, caused an accumulation of
freight at the docks and warehouses. This congestion, in the latter part of 1943, handicapped projected military
operations. Relief came in late December 1943 and early January 1944. when two port battalions (the 497th and 408th),
a total of eight port companies, arrived.
As the new port troops tackled the congestion problem at Calcutta, arrangements were made to discontinue convoys from
Colombo temporarily to relieve the pressure. Madras was then opened as a sub-port to which overflow traffic
could be diverted from Calcutta. Gradually the amount of cargo discharged monthly more than doubled in January 1944,
and in February totaled 128,397 tons, a record for the year.
By March, the bottleneck was broken. Between June and October the maximum time lost waiting for a berth was one day.
This was helped when American barge equipment and low-bed trailers and tractors were received, and the Assam LOC
increased its ability to move supplies up to forward areas.
During 1944, the port handled most American cargo arriving in the CBI (1,092,625 vs. Karachi's under 100,000 tons).
Calcutta played an important role in making the CBI the leader in U.S. Army port discharge performance throughout
overseas theaters.
Increased cargo arrivals, beginning in November 1944, resulted in further expansion of port activities; they peaked in
March 1945, when 173,441 tons were discharged from 66 vessels.
After March 1945, monthly cargo arrivals fell off although still greater than most of 1944. Except that in May, a large
number of British and foreign vessels arrived in preparation for the Rangoon operation. Cargo discharged from
June - September 1945 averaged 122,549 tons a month, and in July they set a new theater record discharging 3,034 tons
in 30 hours.
The one large loading operation before the end of the war was the transfer of the XXth Bomber Command to the Pacific.
This Involved 10,257 men and loading 10 cargo ships with 13,932 tons of cargo and 2,291 vehicles.
Meanwhile, Calcutta had taken over the theater's debarkation and embarkation activities.
After their successful experimental run, two C-4's arrived there on April 27. 1945, and anchored in the stream;
5,752 troops were ferried to Princep Ghat and loaded on trains. Embarking troops were then ferried to the ships and
were all aboard on May 6.
Procedures were improved as successive troopships arrived, but selection of Shaltmar Siding for embarkation proved
unfortunate since troops had to carry their duffle bags a quarter mile before reaching the ferry. Later, the Princep
Ghat was used and improvements were made when transports came aside the jetties and delivered personnel directly to
shore without the use of ferries.
To deal with delays in obtaining trains, troops were then moved by river steamer from Princep Ghat to Kanchrapara
staging area. Later, such movements were made by truck.
Towards the end of the war efforts were made to ship troops aboard cargo vessels as well as troop transports.
From May 20 - September 2, 1945, a total of 17,666 troops embarked at Calcutta with 16,028 debarked.
With war's end the flow of traffic into Calcutta was reversed. Eleven of 29 ships enroute to CBI were returned to the
U.S. and three were diverted to Shanghai. Cargo and troop arrivals at Calcutta declined sharply in September and were
negligible thereafter. At the same time, personnel being evacuated from China and all parts of India and Burma began
moving into the Calcutta area.
The main postwar cargo operations involved the shipment of petroleum products and general cargo to the newly-opened
port of Shanghai; the dumping at sea of deteriorating ammunition and chemical warfare toxics; and the return to the
U.S. of all other materials. By the end of February 1946, most of the faculties at the King George Docks were returned
to the Calcutta Port Trust. From the start of October 1945 through April 1946, a total of 320,437 tons was shipped to
the U.S., Shanghai, or to other overseas areas.
In the meantime, Calcutta had joined Karachi in evacuation of troops.
The first ship, the General Black, arrived on September 26, 1945 and took on 3,005 passengers.
Subsequent arrivals were either other C-4 "General" troopships or smaller WSA "Marine" vessels capable of carrying
about 2,500 passengers.
Transports were generally berthed at Princep Ghat or the Man-of-War Mooring.
Embarkation activities reached a peak in November when 21,990 embarked on eight transports.
The closing of Karachi port in January 1946 kept Calcutta busy for another month. By the end of April, 187,761 troops
had departed the Theater by water. Of these, 197,576 left from Calcutta. The final embarkation took place on May 30,
when 812 passengers boarded the Marine Jumper.
MADRAS AND COLOMBO
These ports were used at first as emergency ports to lighten vessels whose draft did not permit entrance into the
Hooghly River. Madras was opened as a sub-port of Calcutta in February 1944 to handle overflow shipping. After
discharging 24,363 tons in February and March, the port received only minor tonnages. These were limited to lightening
of vessels and the discharge of small coastwise shipments.
Another minor American port was established at Colombo following the transfer of the Southeast Asia Command Headquarters
from New Delhi to Kandy, Ceylon. It was used for the discharge of cargo for U.S. Army personnel.
By October 1945, cargo arrivals had ceased.
THE ASSAM LINE OF COMMUNICATIONS
The transportation system leading from Calcutta into Assam, called the Assam Line of Communications (LOC), was
described by an Army logistician in the War Department as "The most fascinating and complex problem we have in the
world." It consisted of rail, water, rail-water, water-rail, and to a limited extent, rail-highway routes.
Traffic over the MRS line continued to Increase into the first months of 1945. At Parbatipur, the arrival of modem
cargo handling equipment enabled the MRS to increase the number of wagons trans-shipped from 13,470 in October 1944, to
26,796 in May 1945. Operations were further improved with the arrival of additional U.S. equipment. By May 1945, 263 out of
444 locomotives were U.S. made, plus 10,113 freight cars. After August, rail movements, with the exception of westward
movement of evacuated troops, fell off sharply. The MRS troops were evacuated starting late August 1945, and transfer of
the line to the Bengal and Assam Railroad was completed by October 15.
Locomotive on the Bengal & Assam Railroad
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The Bengal and Assam Railroad was the main carrier on the LOC. Supplies were shipped from Calcutta over a broad-gauge
line 200 and 275 miles respectively to Santahar and Parbatipur. They were the principle points for transfer from
broad-gauge to meter gauge railroads. The rail wagons then moved to the Brahmaputra River where they were ferried
across, and then proceeded to Tinsukia, whence they traveled over the short meter-gauge Dibru-Sadiya Railroad to Ledo,
576 miles from Parbatipur.
The railroads were supplemented by two steamship lines, which hauled supplies approximately
1,100 miles up the Brahmaputra from Calcutta to Dibrugarh in Assam. The river and rail systems were closely intertwined
and there were numerous junctions along the route where supplies might be shipped by rail to Goalundo, barged to Dhubri
or Neamati, and thence proceeded by rail to final destination.
There was no all-weather through highway from Calcutta to Assam. A motor road, however, did extend eastward from
Siliguri at the northern terminus of the Bengal and Assam RR, through Bongaigaon to Jogighopa. From this point,
vehicles could be ferried across the Brahmaputra and then proceed over the Assam Truck Road to Chabua and Ledo.
Late in 1943, a limited convoy operation was in operation by SOS Intermediate Section No. 2 from Bongaigaon to Chabua.
The LOC was ill-prepared to take on wartime traffic. Part of the broad-gauge line and most of the meter-gauge line were
single tracked. The latter was a bottleneck; there were no bridges across the Brahmaputra; the steep gradient at the
eastern end of the line made travel slow and hazardous; and monsoons annually disrupted service by washing out tracks
and damaging rail bridges across smaller rivers. Also, the
Bengal and Assam Railroad was called upon to handle increasing traffic. Like the railways, the inland waterway lines were
disrupted during the monsoons. At the start of the war, the Assam LOC carried only about 1,000 to 1,500 tons daily.
To increase its capacity, in order to support military activities in northeast India, military movement control was
gradually introduced. By October 1942, the capacity for military traffic had been increased to 2,800 tons a day, but this
was inadequate to cope with the supplies being poured into the LOC.
The British then planned in 1943 to construct double tracks, sidings, and a bridge over the Brahmaputra; but few of
these projects were completed during the year. As a result, the port of Calcutta became congested.
Supplies to Assam took up to 55 days for delivery; and it was not uncommon for shipments to be held more than 30 days
on river barges as the year ended. This was of vital importance to the military which was then engaged in expanding
construction and airlift operations in Assam, and was about to launch a campaign in north Burma.
American officials pressed the British to militarize transport on the LOC. In a compromise, they agreed to a system of
semi-military control with U.S. participation in a control board. So, then, a LOC panel implemented allotments and
controlled day by day operations.
The British made improvements at important rail and river trans-shipment points. Also, they constructed a four-inch
pipeline on the Chandranathpur-Manipur Road sector. That line was later extended from Chittogong to Tinsukia. These new
pipelines eased the burden on the hard pressed railways, and greatly increased the capacity of the LOC.
Playing a vital part in the LOC's development was the transfer to U.S. control of the meter-gauge line from Katihar to
Ledo, a portion of the LOC long considered to be a major obstacle to rapid movement of supplies to Assam.
What had been a major transportation problem in March '44, was being licked in May. CBI SOS reported to the War
Department on July 15 that the target for LOC tonnage set for January '46 had been exceeded, except for the movement of
petroleum products which were then unavailable in sufficient quantities. When the India-Burma Theater was created
in October 1944 (and a separate China Theater), the Assam LOC was no longer a problem for the movement of supplies to
the forward areas. U.S. and British
shipments had increased from 112,500 tons in March 1944 to 209,748 tons in October. Some problems remained, however,
such as handling of heavy lifts at trans-shipment points, and in meeting the ever-increasing demand for
petroleum products for the East Bengal and Assam airfields.
Traffic mounted steadily into the spring of 1945. In March 1945, a record 274,121 tons of U.S. and British military supplies
were shipped by river, rail, and by pipeline. The largest new addition to the LOC came in March with the completion
of the six-inch pipeline from Chittogong to Tinsukia; this augmented deliveries by the Calcutta-Tinsukia pipeline and
the rail and river carriers. Together they provided petroleum products needed for Hump deliveries; fueled the U.S.
pipelines extending from Tinsukia into Burma toward China; and supplied fuel for the vehicles on the Burma Road.
When campaigns in Burma ended, demand for supplies lessened; but this was partially offset by the need for deliveries
to China, especially for fuel needed for air, truck and pipeline operations. This amounted to 135,796 tons in August
1945.
Upon termination of hostilities, traffic dwindled; the joint U.S.-British panel was discontinued, and by the middle of
October 1945, U.S. railway troops were removed.
THE MILITARY RAILWAY SERVICE IN INDIA-BURMA
In December 1944, the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia Command (SEAC), Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, wrote of
the MRS: "In the first few months of my appointment to this command, the inadequacy of the Assam LOC to meet in full the requirements of the forces in the
forward area and of the airlift over the Hump into China was a major obstacle hindering the full deployment of U.S.
strength against the enemy.
"Already the capacity of the Assam LOC. as a whole, has been developed to a stage where planned development is being
reached months ahead of schedule. Through the hard work and resourcefulness of your railway battalions and those
associated with them, the volume of traffic handled has mounted steadily until the LOC is functioning with a
substantial margin over essential requirements which will enable unforeseen contingencies to be met."
The use of U.S. railway troops on the bottleneck meter-gauge rail portion of the Assam LOC was approved by the Government
of India in February 1944. The MRS would operate 804 miles of the railway branch lines from Dhubri and from Neamati; and
from Furkating to Jorhat; and also on the short Dibru-Sadiya line to Ledo.
In December 1943, MRS Headquarters was set up at Gauhati under Col. J. A. Appleton (later by Col. Yount). In January
1944, a railway grand division (five railway operating battalions, and a railway shop battalion) arrived.
In March 1944, the MRS took over the railroad; its 4,200 troops were super-imposed on the existing civilian staff of
13,000. The 705th Railway Grand Division was stationed at the midway point at Gauhati; the 758th Railway Shop Battalion
at Saidpur with a detachment at Dibrugarh.
To relieve the bottleneck, the MRS forced the loading of the maximum number of wagons (up to 100) at Parbatipar. This
greatly expedited the movements. As a result, the meter-gauge railway was soon hauling more tonnage than the 233 mile
broad-gauge system running north of Calcutta.
As critical points of the MRS line were brought under control, Parbatipur (the trans-shipment point between the broad
and the meter-gauge lines) controlled by the British became the bottleneck. So, in October 1944 the MRS, through the
28th Traffic Regulating Group took over all trans-shipment activities at Parbatipur.
In the path of the railroad were some 30 rivers and tributaries that were a constant threat during the monsoons.
The MRS took flood control measures by reinforcing bridges, cutting diversionary channels for the waterways,
and other such measures.
The 758th Railway Shop Battalion improved the repair and maintenance function. Before they took over, much of the
existing rolling stock had deteriorated. With critical short spare parts obtained from the U.S., they no longer had to
cannibalize existing equipment. In 1944, the unit repaired over 47,000 cars and converted about 188 boxcars into troop
trains, refrigerator cars and low side gondolas.
From the time the MRS took over, records for tonnage hauled continued to be broken, and the number of troops carried by
rail reached a peak of 92,000 (US and Allied) moving east through Pandu, and later moved 133,000 returning.
RAIL OPERATIONS IN BURMA
The MRS also provided personnel for an unusual rail operation in support of Allied troops driving down the rail
corridor from Myitkyina. The 61st Composite Co. of 160 men, began operating the captured portion of the railway.
Only 376, out of 571, rail wagons were unscathed from Allied bombings, and most of the tracks were not serviceable.
The 61st, set up shops, mounted armed jeeps on flanged wheels, placing them at each end of the trains for motive
power and protection. These were used to move supplies and troops mainly in support of the British 36th Division.
Engineer troops had already begun to repair tracks and bridges over the 38 miles of track from Myitkyina to Mogaung.
Despite nearby enemy activity, they moved 15,615 troops and 1883 tons of supplies in August 1944.
During the ensuing months, jeeps were replaced by locomotives and other repairs were made. By the end of January 1945,
the rail line extended 128 miles to Mawlu. They also supplied the 10th Air Force Base at Sahmaw. After moving 40,271
passengers, and 73,312 tons of freight in January 1945, traffic declined. In March 1945, the unit returned to Assam.
In August, the 61st became the first unit from the Theater to return to the U.S. for demobilization.
AMERICAN BARGE LINES IN INDIA
"Sea Mules" at work on the barge line from Calcutta
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In May 1943, it was proposed to establish an American Barge Line (ABL) on the Irrawaddy River, between Rangoon and Bhamo.
In Washington, preparations were made to procure the necessary equipment and personnel.
Later, the Combined Chiefs of Staff decided to use the ABL on the Brahmaputra River. The requirements were for 400
barges. 180 Chrysler sea mules, and 114 wooden patrol boats. Personnel needs were for a headquarters unit,
four harbor craft companies, a port battalion, and an engineer battalion. Later it was found that the equipment
procured was not suited for the Brahmaputra River so the ABL was to be used for harbor duty and short river hauls.
Meanwhile, the ABL Headquarters was established near Calcutta in November of 1943. Equipment began arriving early in
1944, and assembly was started by the engineer troops, assisted by native labor. The 326th and 327th TC Harbor Craft
Companies arrived in April, and they began operations to the Calcutta area. By mid 1944 they were hauling approximately
5.000 tons a month from shipside to depots and airfields up river.
A second important activity (in August 1944) was to support two U.S. airfields at Tezgaon and Kurmitola, near Dacca in
East Bengal. They hauled petroleum products from Goalunab to Dacca, a round trip of about 200 miles.
They ALSO hauled dry cargo for the Air Force from Khulma to Dacca.
ABL operations around the port of Calcutta continued to expand; they moved about 20.000 tons a month, and also provided
general passenger service.
To support Hump operations, and lighten the load on rail and pipelines, the ABL began to deliver almost four million
gallons of fuel monthly from Goalundo to Dacca; as well as over 10.000 tons of dry cargo from Khulma to Dacca.
In August 1945, the ABL operation closed and the remaining craft and personnel were used at Calcutta to assist in the
evacuation of troops and supplies.
MOTOR TRANSPORTATION ON THE STILWELL ROAD
The task of restoring land communications with China was started in December 1942. Pending the recapture of the Line
of Communication (LOC) from Rangoon northward, it was decided to follow a route from Ledo through the Hukawng and
Mogaung Valleys in North Burma to a junction with the Burma Road. After the U.S. assumed responsibility for construction
of the road, American troops took over and continued work begun by the British.
The mountainous jungle of the Patkai Hills between Ledo and Shingbwiyang, at the foot of the Hukawng Valley, presented
a formidable barrier. After trucks went as far as the road would permit, native porters took over through narrow trails
and mud. This precluded the use of elephants and pack animals. Supplies were air-dropped by the spring of 1943.
Construction went slowly and was virtually halted during the monsoons in May. In October 1943, Col. Lewis A. Pick
(later Major Gen.) was appointed commander of Base Section No. 3 (later called Advanced Section No. 3), and took command of
all SOS forces on the Ledo Road. When the monsoons ended, rapid progress was made. By the end of 1943, bulldozers had
reached Shingbwiyang at the 103 mile mark, and in late December, the first convoy arrived there from Ledo.
As Allied forces struck deeper into North Burma, the road was pushed forward behind them.
Plans when the road was completed, called for movement of about 85,250 tons a month to Kunming, and 16.500 tons for
use in Burma.
Assuming that the Allies would recapture North Burma down to Bhamo by February 1944, and that the rest of Burma would be
retaken before the monsoon in May, plans called for the development of the LOC, first from India through North Burma,
and then northward from Rangoon. It called for water shipments to Calcutta and Rangoon, the latter to receive the bulk
of shipments for China; onward movement from Calcutta by rail and river to Ledo, and from
Rangoon by barge on the Irrawaddy River to Bhamo; and finally deliveries to Kunming by truck and pipeline from Bhamo
and Ledo. This called for the use of 18,000 drivers. 12,000 ¾-ton truck-tractors, and 10,000 5-ton semi-trailers; all
to arrive between January and June of 1944. The Combined Chiefs of Staff later decided that combat operations in the
dry season of '43-'44 would be limited to North Burma. As a result, all attention was then given to the Ledo-Burma Road.
Thus, the combination of the 5-ton 4x2 truck-tractor and the 5-ton semi-trailer was selected for the planned operation.
and the War Department undertook procurement action of 8,000 of these units in September 1944.
At the Allied Quadrant conference, new plans were made based on an input of 96,000 tons at Ledo, of which 65.000
tons would go to Kunming. The result was in February, a block system of operations requiring 8,270 truck-trailers and
92,800 service troops. The plan called for bitumen surfacing of two lanes. Later plans cut this down to a monthly input
Trucks on the Ledo Road in Burma
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of 57.000 tons of which 45.000 would go to Kunming, and included 36,727 service troops (drivers, maintenance and support).
By April 1944, approximately 300 cargo vehicles were being dispatched dally over the Ledo Road.
Until the fall of 1944, plans for the Ledo-Burma Road operations were based on two-way traffic from Ledo to Kunming and
the use of truck-trailers. But then there was the possibility that such vehicles would be unable to operate over
the mountainous Ledo-Shingbwiyang section. This then gave rise to proposals for the partial use of 2½-ton 6x6
trucks.
In the meantime, the War Department, in order to make more resources available for the Pacific, cut back construction
plans for the Ledo Road. In August 1944, CBI was notified that a two-track gravel all-weather road would be completed
from Ledo to Myitkyina; also that the existing trail from Myitkyina would be improved with the minimum construction
required to complete projected pipelines into China and to deliver vehicles and artillery, (i.e.. two-way traffic to
Myitkyina but only one-way traffic to Kunming). As a result, scheduled production of truck-tractors and semi-trailers
was cut back to 5,050 and 4,210 respectively. When the China Theater was created in October 1944, the Ledo Road was
then operational only as far as Warazup, 190 miles from Ledo, and was being pushed rapidly toward Myitkyina.
To provide drivers, a training school was opened at Ramgarh with 500 Chinese students. Other Chinese were flown in from
China and a number of Chinese tank battalions at Ramgarh were converted to truck units.
Tests in December 1944 confirmed that truck-trailers were unsuitable over the mountainous Ledo-Shingbwiyang run, so
the India-Burma Theater requested that 2½-ton trucks be substituted. Further changes were then made by the War
Department which provided that road operations would be limited to one-way deliveries of vehicles; also that the six-inch
pipeline originally planned for extension into China would be suspended at Myitkyina. leaving only a four-inch line to
be completed to Kunming: also that Hump deliveries would be greatly increased.
By January 12, 1945, the Ledo Road had been joined with the old Burma Road, and the Japanese were being cleared from
the route. So, restoration of land communications with China was at hand.
Accompanied by the media, engineers, military police, and Chinese drivers and convoy guards, American drivers under
Col. Dewitt T. Mullett, the convoy commander, pushed off for China with the first convoy. After being delayed by
fighting enroute, the vehicles rolled into Kunming on February 4. Three days earlier, the dispatch of regular convoys
had begun.
The opening of the Ledo-Burma Road, soon to be redesignated the Stilwell Road. forged the last link in the chain of
land communications between Calcutta and Kunming. To feed this supply line, vehicles were moved by rail from Calcutta
to Siliguri, Bongalgaon, or direct to Ledo. Under the direction of SOS Intermediate Section No. 2, vehicles were convoyed
from Siliguri or Bongaigaon to Chabua for delivery to Ledo and onward shipment to China. Thus, the highway LOC actually
extended 1.759 miles from Siliguri to Kunming.
The Stilwell Road itself was 1,079 miles long. From Ledo to Myitkyina the road was of two-way, all weather, gravel
construction, the first 103 miles traversing the Patkai Hills before extending across the flat jungle country of the
Hukawng and Mogaung Valleys to Myitkyina. From Myitkyina to Bhamo, a one-lane route continues to join the Burma Road at
Mong Yu, 470 miles from Ledo. From Mong Yu to Kunming, the road was two-lane, all-weather, and hard surfaced over most
of the distance, but rough with long grades.
Anxious to begin operations as soon as possible, SOS Headquarters on January 21, ordered Advance Section No. 3
to start the one-way movement of vehicles to China immediately; but Advance Section No. 3 was not yet organized to set up
the necessary convoy details. The only vehicles available in the Ledo area were trucks in poor repair condition.
As a result, ordnance personnel worked through the night to recondition the vehicles. Drivers were provided by
the Chinese Army in India, and personnel from a Quartermaster truck company in Burma were diverted to accompany convoys
as far as Myitkyina. On the following morning, 50 vehicles and 100 drivers made the start.
Early in 1945, a Motor Transportation Service (MTS) was established under Col. Charles C. Davis, operating under
Advance Section No. 3.
THE BURMA HAUL
Burma convoy operations had been established long before the Stilwell Road was opened to China. Since late 1943,
Quartermaster truck companies had the job of carrying personnel and supplies from Ledo to Shingbwiyang and beyond as
road construction moved forward. Although the men and animals in combat were dependent on air-drop, the forward air
supply bases at Shingbwiyang and Warazup were themselves supplied by road. Throughout the year, the truck drivers moved
supplies from Ledo to Burma bases, negotiating steep grades and hairpin turns, traveling through dust and mud. In the
rainy season it was not unusual to see bulldozers dragging vehicles out of flooded-out muddy roads.
As the monsoons neared its end, all available drivers and vehicles were assigned to Burma convoy operations.
In the latter part of the month about 550 tons a day were being carried. By January 1945, 46 truck companies were
engaged in the Burma Haul. At this time, 13 other companies were assigned to intrabase and depot operations, and 13
additional units were enroute to the CBI.
In early 1945, all shipments to Burma were made by 2½-ton trucks, which returned to Ledo; beginning in February,
five-ton truck-tractors and semi-trailers were substituted over the rest of the Burma run. By May, there were 38
Quartermaster truck companies assigned to the Burma Haul.
STILWELL ROAD
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For a time, American trucking units were supplemented by convoys driven by Chinese military units.
The Chinese never proved satisfactory because American liaison officers assigned to the units had no command function.
This problem ended with the movement of Chinese troops out of Burma.
CHINA CONVOY OPERATIONS
The first month of China convoy operations was one of constant crisis, with a lack of drivers being the most serious
problem. After the first regular convoy on February 1, 1945, efforts were made to use Chinese drivers with American
officers in charge, but the experiment proved a dismal failure. The training at Ramgarh was inadequate, and on February
24, Gen. Pick reported that he had 1,400 Chinese graduate drivers at Ledo, none of which were prepared for convoy duty.
Additional training was then given by Advance Section No. 3, but the trainees never proved entirely satisfactory, so their
use came to an end in June 1945. To keep the vehicles moving to China, several converted tank battalion, with
experienced drivers, were used, 150 of them were returned by air for additional hauls after delivering vehicles.
Other drivers were obtained from the 330th Engineer Regiment, and from Chinese completing advanced training to Ledo.
In addition, American units moving to China were assigned vehicles consigned to China. With the foregoing, 22 convoys
(of 1,333 vehicles and 609 trailers, carrying 1,111 tons of cargo) made it to Kunming in February 1945.
In the months that followed, the MTS used volunteers from a11 over the India-Burma Theater, Chinese and American
casuals and units moving to China, some Chinese trainees, and such Quartermaster truck drivers as could be spared from
the Burma operations. Volunteers and other MTS drivers were returned by air over the Hump. In this manner MTS was able
to increase deliveries of 2,342 vehicles, 1,185 trailers and 4,198 tons of cargo in April; but no firm solution to the
driver problem had yet been found. '
Relief came in May and June with the end of the combat operations in Central Burma, and the assignment of Indian
civilian drivers. This permitted the release of Quartermaster truck companies for China convoy duty. and in June enabled
the MTS to discontinue the use of Chinese drivers. On July 17. 1945, a total of 26 truck companies were being used
for China convoy duty. Also, the only other vehicles consigned to China were those added to U.S. Army units moving
to China.
A China Traffic Branch was set up to control all convoys from Ledo to Kunming. Nine stations in all, were there to
provide maintenance, messing, communications, and overnight quarters. Also. a Border Guard Station at Wanting and later
at Mong Yu was established, manned by MPs to see that only authorized personnel passed through.
Problems crept up, such as poor convoy discipline and laxity in maintenance of vehicles by drivers. This was corrected
by vigorous MP control and assignment of tools and native labor at these control stations.
By May 1945, operations were in high gear; 78 convoys delivered 4,682 trucks, 1,103 trailers, and 8,435 tons of cargo.
With exclusive use of American drivers in June, the average time from Ledo to Kunming (originally 18 days) was reduced
to 12-14 days.
THE CLOSE OF STILWELL ROAD OPERATIONS
With war's end. most operations were terminated. In September 1945, only 4,112 tons were delivered to bases to Burma.
On August 27, the final delivery was made to Kunming, and it consisted of 4,000 trucks, and 8,000 tons of cargo.
Vehicle dispatches ended on September 23, except for a few special movements. By November 1, the Stilwell Road was
officially closed; six days later the MTS was inactivated.
From February 1 - October 8, 1945, a total of 25,783 vehicles and 6,539 trailers were delivered to China by MTS drivers
and by American and Chinese units, in addition to 38,062 tons of cargo.
Stilwell Road deliveries were overshadowed by the Hump airlift, and after the pipeline to Kunming was operating,
its deliveries exceeded the net cargo over the road.
Considering the problems of drivers, road and climatic conditions. the record of motor transport on the Stilwell Road
is impressive. The number of vehicles delivered greatly relieved the critical transportation situation in China.
Cargo delivered to Burma helped make the Burma campaigns. and road and pipeline construction possible. Within the
confines of Its mission, and the resources available, the Stilwell Road made a valuable contribution to the war in
Southeast Asia and materially Improved the intra-China transportation system.
China-Burma-India Theater
Truck convoy operates on the famous 21 curves at Annan between Chanyi and Kweiyang, China.
Drivers often battled with bandits who would board the slow moving vehicles to pilfer supplies.